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ABSTRACT
Macroeconomists have for some time been aware that the New Keynesian Phillips curve, though
highly popular in the literature, cannot explain the persistence observed in actual inflation. We argue that
two of the more prominent alternative formulations, the Fuhrer and Moore (1995) relative contracting
model and the Blanchard and Katz (1999) reservation wage conjecture, are highly problematic. Fuhrer
and Moore (1995)’s formulation generates inflation persistence, but this is a consequence of their
assuming that workers care about the past real wages of other workers.  Making the more reasonable
assumption that workers care about the current real wages of other workers, one obtains the standard
formulation with no inflation persistence. The Blanchard and Katz conjecture turns out to imply that
inflation depends negatively on itself lagged, i.e. the opposite of the empirical regularity.
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The short run relationship between inflation and unemployment, which has been highly 
controversial for decades, is now even more puzzling. Much of the literature has 
converged on one particular specification, the “New Keynesian Phillips curve”, based on 
John Taylor (1980) and Guillermo Calvo (1983). Indeed, Bennett McCallum (1997) has 
called it the “the closest thing there is to a standard formulation”. Richard Clairda, Jordi 
Gali and Mark Gertler (1999) have used a version of it as the basis for deriving some 
general principles about monetary policy.  However, as has been recently pointed out by 
N. Gregory Mankiw (2001): “Although the new Keynesian Phillips curves has many 
virtues, it also has one striking vice: It is completely at odd with the facts.” Larry Ball 
(1994) gave an early indication of this, by showing that this model predicts that an 
anticipated disinflation is expansionary, which seemed inconsistent with the experiences 
of many countries in the 1980s and 90s. More forcefully, Jeff Fuhrer and George Moore 
(1995) showed that the model predicts stickiness in prices, but not in inflation, and thus is 
unable to explain the inertia of actual inflation. 
The empirical failure of  the standard formulation of the short-run aggregate 
supply curve has led to a number of new models that do exhibit persistence in inflation. 
One formulation, by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) (which they refer to as the relative 
contracting model) has been widely used in the literature and in popular graduate text 
books (e.g. Carl Walsh (1998), pp. 224-225, 460-467, 472-474, and David Romer (2001) 
pp. 295-296). Another suggestion, by Olivier Blanchard and Larry Katz (1999), is that 
inflation persistence may be explained by taking into account the dependence of workers’ 
reservation wages on past wages. A third route, adopted by John Roberts (1998) and Ball   3
(2000), is to apply different varieties of near-rational expectation formation, essentially a 
form of adaptive expectations, to staggered wage-setting models. 
In this note we argue that the proposals by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and 
Blanchard and Katz (1999) are highly problematic. As a justification for their new model, 
Fuhrer and Moore argue that agents care about relative real wages, and not about nominal 
wages. We show that this motivation is misleading. Fuhrer and Moore’s model is based 
on agents caring about the real wages that other workers obtained in the past. If Fuhrer 
and Moore’s model were modified so that workers cared about the contemporaneous real 
wages of other workers, which is arguably the more reasonable assumption, then the 
model coincides with the standard formulation of Taylor (1980), and there is no inflation 
persistence.
1 
Blanchard and Katz do not formally model their point, but refer among other 
things to that fact that unemployment benefits institutionally depend on previous wages, 
suggesting that reservation wages will move with lagged wages. They conclude (page 73) 
“that taking into account the dependence of the reservation wage on past wages holds a 
key to understanding the dependence of inflation on itself lagged.” We propose two 
alternative representations of their idea, and show that in contrast to the presumption by 
Blanchard and Katz (1999), this idea implies that inflation depends negatively on itself 
lagged.   4
 
The Fuhrer and Moore model 
Consider the two-period framework used by Taylor (1980) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995). 
Wages are set in contracts lasting for two periods. Contracts are staggered, so that half of 
the contracts are set in each period. Let xt denote the log of the contract wage set in 
period t. Prices are a constant unit markup over wages so that the log of the price index in 
period t, pt, is the average of the contract wages negotiated in period t and period t-1. 
 
(1) pt = ½ (xt + xt-1). 
 
Taylor (1980) assumed that contract wages are set as a average of the lagged and the 
expected future wage contracts, adjusted for excess demand yt. 
 
(2) xt = ½ (xt-1 + Etxt+1) + kyt      k  >  0. 
 
(2) can be rearranged to  
 
(3)  ∆xt = Et∆xt+1 + 2kyt, 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 This paper is not the first to question the microfoundations of Fuhrer and Moore (1995); 
c.f. Roberts (1998) and Taylor (1999). However, their arguments are different from ours. 
Roberts’ criticism is that the model implies agents “are concerned about having a large 
change in their nominal wage relative to inflation when employment is high. Hence, the 
Fuhrer and Moore model “slips a derivative” relative to the conventional 
microeconomics”. Taylor argues that the wage should be related to the price level over 
the full contract period, a point already acknowledged by Fuhrer and Moore in their 
appendix B.    5
where ∆xt ≡ xt – xt-1. First difference (1) to obtain the rate of inflation as: 
(4)  () 1 2
1
− ∆ + ∆ = ∆ ≡ t t t t x x p π . 
Substituting out for (3) and (3) lagged in (4), we obtain 
 
(5)  πt = Etπt+1 + k(yt + yt-1) 
 
Thus, as emphasized by Fuhrer and Moore (1995), in the Taylor model any persistence in 
πt must derive from persistence in yt. In contrast, Fuhrer and Moore propose a new 
contracting equation, where agents care about relative real wages: 
 
(6) xt - pt = ½ (xt-1 - pt-1 + Et(xt+1 - pt+1)) + kyt. 
 
Substituting the definition of xt in equation (6) into the price index equation (1), yields 
 
(7)  πt = ½ (πt-1 + Etπt+1) + (k/2) (yt + yt-1). 
 
Thus, there is persistence in inflation, as lagged inflation enters with a positive 
coefficient.  
To justify their model, Fuhrer and Moore (page 131) argue: “In the relative wage 
specification, however, agents compare the real value of their wage contracts with the 
real value of wage contracts previously negotiated and still in effect, and with contracts 
expected to be negotiated over the duration of the contract period ..” However, this 
justification is misleading. Presumably, the most natural interpretation of “the real value   6
of wage contracts previously negotiated that are still in effect” is xt-1 – pt, i.e. the nominal 
wages set in the previous period evaluated at current prices. In contrast, according to (6), 
agents care about xt-1 – pt-1, that is, the real wages that the other group of workers had in 
the previous period.
2 
  Much more importantly, however, the assumption implicit in (6) is difficult to 
defend theoretically. It is not difficult to explain why agents may compare their own real 
wage with the real wage that other groups obtain at the same time, and many other 
studies make this assumption (eg V. Bhaskar, 1990). However, it is harder to understand 
why workers should compare their own real wage with the real wage other groups had 
last period. 
  To explore the consequences of the more reasonable assumption, that workers 
care about the real wage other groups obtain at the same time, we substitute xt-1 - pt for  
xt-1 - pt-1 in (6). Furthermore, we also make the theoretically preferable assumption that 
the real wage to be determined is the expected real wage over the contract period, and not 
the real wage in the first period of the contract period (as also argued by Fuhrer and 
Moore, 1995, in their appendix B). Thus, we substitute xt – ½(pt + Etpt+1) for xt - pt on the 
RHS of (6)
3, to obtain 
 
(8) xt – ½(pt + Etpt+1) = ½ (xt-1 - pt + Et(xt+1 - pt+1)) + kyt. 
 
                                                 
2 Later in the paper, Fuhrer and Moore note (p. 141) that defining preferences over xt-1 – 
pt-1 is “a convenient simplification”. 
3 Retaining xt - pt would not change the conclusion qualitatively.   7
However, it is immediate that (8) can be simplified to (2), that is, the standard framework 
of Taylor (1980). Thus, the crucial feature of the model of Fuhrer and Moore is not that 
agents care about relative real wages; indeed, the standard formulation of Taylor is 
consistent with that. The crucial feature of the model of Fuhrer and Moore is that agents 
are assumed to care about the real wages that other groups had in the previous period, 
which is an assumption that is harder to justify.  
 
Effect of past wages 
From Fuhrer and Moore’s formulation one might also expect inflation persistence to be 
generated if workers cared about their own past wages;  this is the conjecture of 
Blanchard and Katz (1999). One can think of various ways in which past wages may 
affect the wage setting. Blanchard and Katz refer to the fact that unemployment benefits 
depend on past wages. In a bargaining setting, the outcome might then depend on past 
wages, through the effect of the unemployment benefits, as well as on the expected real 
wages of other workers. Observe however that benefits are linked to past nominal wages, 
while the real value depends on current prices. Thus, workers who negotiate in period t 
had their past wages negotiated in period t-2, implying that real benefits depend on xt-2 – 
pt. Extending the Taylor formulation to include this aspect suggests the following 
formulation (where 0 < γ < 1): 
 
(9)  () t t t t t t t t t t t t ky p x E p x p x p E p x + − + −
−
+ − = + − + + − − + ] [
2
1
) ( ) (
2
1




Substituting (1) in (9) and rearranging yield    8
 
(10)  t t t t t ky x E x x + ∆
−
+ ∆ − = ∆
+








Using the definition of πt from (4) in (10), we obtain 
 
(11)  t t t t t y E x x +
−






Using (4) and (11), we obtain 
 
(12)  () () 1 1 1 1 2 4
2
− − + − + + +
−
+ − = t t t t t t t t y y
k
E E π π
γ
γπ π . 
 
Thus, the direct effect of lagged inflation is negative, the opposite of the inflation 
persistence evident in data.
4 As in the Taylor model, any persistence must derive from 
persistence in yt. The intuition for the negative effect of lagged inflation is that high 
inflation in period t-1 reduces the real value of the workers’ benefits’, and thus weakens 
workers’ bargaining position. This dampens wage growth in period t, and consequently 
lowers period t inflation. 
                                                 
4 The negative direct effect of lagged inflation is the result of the negative effect of 
lagged wage growth, as is evident from a comparison of (10) with the corresponding 
Taylor equation (3). 
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Past wages may also affect wage setting if workers’ aspirations in job search and 
wage bargaining are shaped by their previous earnings, as also suggested by Blanchard 
and Katz (1999). One justification for this, proposed by Tore Ellingsen and Steinar 
Holden (1998), is that past expectations may affect wage setting via workers’ choice of 
durable consumption goods. To see whether this idea may explain inflation persistence, 
consider a formulation where the wage outcome depends on the real wages that the 
workers had in the previous period, xt-2 – pt-1, as well as on the expected wages of other 
workers:  
 
(13)  () t t t t t t t t t t t t ky p x E p x p x p E p x + − + −
−
+ − = + − + + − − − + ] [
2
1
) ( ) (
2
1




Substituting (1) in (13) and rearranging yield  
 
(14)  t t t t t ky x E x x + ∆
−
+ ∆ − = ∆
−
+ − 1 1 4
2
2 4
2 γ γ γ
. 
 
Using (4), (14) can be further rearranged to 
 










− = ∆ + − 2
2
2
1 1 . 
 
Using (4) and (15), we obtain 
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(16)  () () 1 1 1 1 2 2
1
2












Again, we find negative direct effect of lagged inflation, the opposite of the inflation 
persistence evident in the data. 
 
Conclusions 
Macroeconomists are faced with a puzzle: the standard theoretical formulation of the 
short run aggregate supply curve seems to be an empirical failure. The standard 
formulation exhibits stickiness in prices but not in inflation, in contrast with the 
persistence in actual inflation. A number of alternative formulations have been proposed. 
We argue that two of the more prominent ones, the Fuhrer and Moore (1995) relative 
contracting model and the Blanchard and Katz (1999) reservation wage conjecture, are 
highly problematic. Fuhrer and Moore (1995)’s formulation generates inflation 
persistence, but this is a consequence of their assuming that workers care about the past 
real wages of other workers. Once one replaces their formulation with the more 
reasonable assumption that workers care about the current real wages of other workers, 
the resulting formulation immediately reduces to the standard formulation with no 
inflation persistence. To explore the Blanchard and Katz conjecture, we specify two 
formulations where workers’ reservation wages depend on their own past wages (either 
because unemployment insurance is related to own past wages or because the past real 
wage has a more direct effect). We find that inflation depends negatively on itself lagged, 
ie the opposite of the empirical regularity. 
  This leaves open the question of how to generate inflation persistence in 
contracting models. Recently, several different alternative types of explanations have   11
been proposed. Roberts (1998) and Ball (2000) have suggested models that relax the 
assumption that expectations are rational. Estaban Jadresic (2000) proposes a staggered 
price-setting model with a flexible distribution of price durations. Mankiw and Ricardo 
Reis (2001) argue that information about macroeconomic conditions diffuses slowly 
through the economy. In a companion paper (John Driscoll and Holden, 2001), we show 
that inflation persistence may be caused by coordination problems associated with 
workers being concerned about fair treatment, in the sense that they care 
disproportionately more about being paid less than other workers than they do about 
being paid more.    12
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